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Cervantes v. Walker: Custodial Interrogation in Prison?
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court held that statements
made by a defendant during custodial interrogation may not be used
by the prosecution unless effective procedural safeguards were used to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.2 Subsequent courts
have encountered difficulty in applying the Miranda "custodial interro-
gation" standard to determine whether a particular situation required
the procedural safeguards. In Cervantes v. Walker,3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Miranda standard
and held that a prison official's questioning of a prisoner concerning
marijuana discovered in the prisoner's belongings was not custodial in-
terrogation.4 The decision diminishes the scope of the Miranda deci-
sion.
Enrigue Cervantes was incarcerated in the county jail.5 Due to a
recent fight with another inmate, Cervantes was being moved by a dep-
uty sheriff from one jail cell to another.6 The deputy instructed
Cervantes to get his belongings and then took him to the jail library to
talk with the shift commander before the move.7 Cervantes left his be-
longings on a table outside the library door and entered the library.8 In
accordance with standard jail procedure when moving inmates, the
deputy searched Cervantes' belongings and discovered a matchbox
containing a green odorless substance suspected to be marijuana.9 The
deputy took the matchbox and contents into the library in order to have
Cervantes identify the substance.'" The library dimensions were about
six feet by four feet." I In the presence of the shift commander, and at a
distance of about one and one-half feet from Cervantes, the deputy
opened the matchbox, showed the contents to the petitioner, and asked,
"What's this?" Cervantes replied, "That's grass man."' 2 The deputy
I. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id at 444.
3. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
4. Id at 429.
5. Id at 426.
6. Id
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id at 427.
10. Id
11. Id.
12. Id
1
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placed Cervantes under arrest. 13 Cervantes' statement to the deputy
was admitted at trial.'4 Cervantes was convicted of possessing narcot-
ics in a county jail and sentenced to three years.' 5 Cervantes petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court challeng-
ing, inter alia, the admission of his statement at trial as violative of his
privilege against self-incrimination.' 6 The district court dismissed the
petition.'7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."' 8 The Court then set forth the procedual safeguards,
now designated as the Miranda warnings. 9 The reasoning behind the
Court's decision was to combat a situation in which there are inher-
ently compelling pressures that work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak when he would otherwise not do
so freely.2°
The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 2'
The Court, however, did not directly address exactly when the right
against self-incrimination arose.22 The reason for the Court's failure to
delve into this problem was evident. The facts of Miranda and its com-
panion cases did not demand a detailed analysis of the problem. 23 All
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. 384 U.S. at 444.
19. Id at 479. The Court stated: "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to a presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed if he so desires."
20. Id at 467.
21. Id at 444.
22. Professor Graham suggests: "Perhaps the Court was reluctant to completely define 'cus-
todial interrogation' before experience revealed the exact scope of the problem with which the
definition would be concerned." Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?" Caliornia's Antici-
patory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 59, 63 (1966).
23. The Supreme Court combined four cases for hearing on the issue of whether the defend-
ant's constitutional rights had been violated during police interrogation. The four cases involved
the admission as evidence of confessions obtained from defendants during police interrogation
without the defendants first being apprised of their constitutional rights: Miranda v. Arizona, 98
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1963); Vignera v. New York, 21 A.D.2d 752, 252 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1961);
Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400
P.2d 97 (1965).
2
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of the cases "share[d] salient features-incommunicado interrogation
in a police dominated atmosphere."24 Confusion arose among subse-
quent court decisions because the Court's definition of custodial inter-
rogation required a warning to be given not only in those cases in
which the "salient features" of Miranda were present, but in all cases
where an individual was "deprived of his freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way."25 Thus, subsequent courts encountered difficulty not in
determining whether there was an interrogation, which was established
in Escobedo v. Illinois,26 but in applying the Miranda standard for cus-
tody.
Miranda, however, discussed situations that were not custodial inter-
rogations. Such situations were designated as on-the-scene question-
ing. The Miranda opinion stated:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of po-
lice officers in investigating crime .... When an individual is in cus-
tody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in
the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include
inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene question-
ing of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our hold-
ing. 27
In applying the Miranda standard, the courts develoned varion.q teqto
IVIULt 1,UUi tS ,UlleU to vanatlons oI an oojective test: wnlettler a reason-
able man similarly situated would believe that he was "in custody" or
"otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."28
In People v. Arnold,29 the California Supreme Court, using a four-fac-
tor test,30 found the questioning of a defendant at the prosecuting attor-
24. 384 U.S. at 445.
25. Id at 444.
26. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27. 384 U.S. at 477. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1026 (1968)(where police interviewed a defendant on a park bench and in a
restaurant); United States v. Essex, 275 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (where defendant invited
two federal agents into her living room); Tillery v. State, 3 Md. App. 142, 238 A.2d 125 (1968)
(where an officer questioned defendant in the hospital merely as a victim of a shooting and was
unaware that defendant had been shot attempting a robbery); Commonwealth v. Barclay, 212 Pa.
Super. 25, 240 A.2d 838 (1968) (where an officer interviewed defendant in defendant's living room
in the presence of both his wife and father, informing him that he had a complaint that defendant
was involved in a "drag race"). The elimination of on-the-scene questioning from the auspice of
custodial interrogation minimized only slightly the subsequent problem of whether an individual
was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444.
28. See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial In-
terrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
29. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 448-49, 426 P.2d 515, 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 (1967). The defendant
testified that she believed she had no other alternative than to comply with the directive summon-
ing her for interrogation. Thus, the Court found that once she had arrived at her summoner's
office, "she might reasonably have believed that if she had attempted to leave during the course of
the interrogation the district attorney would have arrested her or told police officers to physically
detain her."
30. Id at 443, 426 P.2d at 520, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The Court's test is whether a reasonable
3
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ney's office to be custodial interrogation where the prosecuting attorney
had strong reason to believe that the defendant was guilty. In People v.
Yukl, 31 employing the objective standard of a "reasonable man inno-
cent of any crime," the New York Court of Appeals found that state-
ments made by defendant at the police station were voluntary; thus,
Miranda warnings were not required. In United States v. Del Soccorro
Castro,32 also using a four-factor test,33 the Fifth Circuit held that
questioning of a defendant in an air-terminal customs office was custo-
dial interrogation. Other courts employ a more subjective test. In
United States v. Harrison,34 the district court, finding custodial interro-
gation, held that a parolee who was questioned at police headquarters
was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to such questioning. Still other
courts have not applied a specific test, but have examined the environ-
ment in which the questioning took place.35 The Eighth Circuit in Ut-
sler v. Erickson,3 6 held that questioning of defendant in an automobile-
stop situation did not require Miranda warnings because the question-
ing was routine.
The Supreme Court has approached the question on a case-by-case
basis, examining the totality of the circumstances. In Orozco v.
Texas,37 the Court made it clear that custodial interrogation could take
place outside of the police station. The Court found that the defendant
person would have believed that he could not leave freely. The Court considers four factors in
making that determination: (1) language used to summon him; (2) the surroundings of the inter-
rogation; (3) the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) pressure
exerted to detain him.
31. 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S. 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
32. 573 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court's decision hinged on the defendant's testi-
mony that she did not believe she was free to leave, which was buttressed by the customs officer's
request that she accompany him to a confined area some distance from their initial encounter.
33. Id at 215. The Fifth Circuit's test is comprised of four factors: (I) probable cause to
arrest; (2) the subjective intent of the interrogator to hold the suspect; (3) the subjective belief of
the suspect concerning the status of his freedom; and (4) whether the investigation has focused on
the suspect.
34. 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
35. United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1968). The Court held that exculpa-
tory statements made by the defendants at the time they were approached on a street by detectives
were made in the process of an on-the-scene questioning, and were admissible on the basis of
noncompliance with Miranda. United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 1968). The
Court held that the atmosphere surrounding a defendant, who was questioned on the street by an
officer who received an anonymous tip that the defendant was driving a stolen automobile, was
not coercive, and statements freely made by the defendant were admissible, even in the absence of
Miranda warnings.
36. 440 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1971). The Court held, "[t]he police in investigating a proba-
ble offense may ask preliminary questions on identification and the recent whereabouts of persons
under suspicion in order to proceed with the investigation and quickly eliminate those who appear
to be beyond suspicion."
37. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). The Court rested its decision on the Miranda opinion, which de-
clared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was . . . otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Thus, the Court found that the defend-
ant had been significantly deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way because the officer
4
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was "in-custody" when questioned by four officers in his bedroom at
four in the morning concerning his presence at the scene of a homicide.
In Mathis v. United States,38 the Court held that a defendant ques-
tioned in a jail cell by Internal Revenue agents about a matter unre-
lated to his confinement constituted custodial interrogation. In
Beckwith v. United States,39 however, the Court found that a defendant
was not "in-custody" when questioned at another's house by federal
agents concerning income tax violations, even though the questioning
had reached the accusatory stage. In Oregon v. Mathiason,4 0 the Court
did not find custodial interrogation where the defendant, a parolee, was
questioned by an officer at police headquarters behind closed doors.
The Supreme Court has begun to narrow the scope of Miranda, as
evinced by Beckwith and Mathiason where all possible tests were ig-
nored. Other Miranda based decisions also demonstrate a limiting of
Miranda. In Harris v. New York, 4 the Court held that statements
which were inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief because of
insufficient warnings could be used to impeach the defendant's trial tes-
timony. In Michigan v. Tucker,42 statements made by defendant fol-
lowing insufficient warnings were used to locate an individual who was
allowed to give testimony that incriminated the defendant. The Court
found that the use of the testimony did not violate defendant's fifth
amendment rights. In Oregon v. Hass,43 statements made by the de-
fendant following a request to consult with an attorney were used to
impeach his testimony, even though Miranda ruled that if an accused
"states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
testified that the defendant was under arrest and not free to leave, although the defendant had not
been so informed.
38. 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). Here the Court assumed that the defendant was "in-custody." The
only issue raised was whether the Miranda holding only applied to the questioning of one who is
"in-custody" in connection with the very case under investigation. The Court held that Miranda
was not so limited, for "nothing in the Miranda opinion called for a curtailment of the warnings to
be given to a person to be based on the reason why the person is in custody."
39. 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). The Court held that although the investigation had "focused"
on the defendant, he was not in the requisite custodial environment described by Miranda.
40. 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). The Court held that "Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in-custody.' It was
that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited." The Court found that because the defendant was free to leave at any time,
and because he was told prior to the questioning that he was not under arrest, the questioning was
not custodial; thus, no warnings were required.
41. 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). The Court stated: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances."
42. 417 U.S. 433, 448 (1974). The Court held that defendant's statements during the police
interrogation were not involuntary or the result of police coercion, therefore not depriving him of
his privilege against self-incrimination.
43. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
5
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attorney is present."'
Cervantes follows the Supreme Court's trend of limiting the reach of
Miranda. Judge Wallace, writing for the majority, applied the Mi-
randa standard to the facts of the case and found that Cervantes was
not "in-custody" or "significantly deprived of freedom of action," but
concluded that the questioning was more akin to on-the-scene ques-
tioning than interrogation.45
In reaching the decision, Judge Wallace rejected Cervantes' argu-
ment that Mathis v. United States46 held that any questioning during
prison confinement constituted custodial interrogation. He reasoned
that such an interpretation would be contrary to the meaning and spirit
of Miranda because it would disrupt prison administration and elimi-
nate on-the-scene questioning in the prison setting.47
Judge Wallace dismissed Cervantes' argument that the circumstances
of his questioning met the Ninth Circuit's traditional test for finding
custodial interrogation: "whether a reasonable man would have be-
lieved that he could not leave freely."' 48 The Judge did this by noting
that the free to leave test obviously was not practical when applied to
prisoners, 4 and he proceeded to develop another standard. To develop
this modified standard of the objective test, he relied on Oregon v.
Mathiason,5 ° which held that "for custodial interrogation to be found
there must have been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him in custody."'" Using Mathiason's restriction concept, Judge
Wallace modified the court's traditional test to read, "whether a rea-
sonable person would believe there had been a restriction of his free-
dom over and above that in his normal prisoner setting. 52
Judge Wallace applied the modified test to Cervantes' situation and
found that the pressure exerted to detain him was not sufficient to have
caused a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement
was further diminished.53 Judge Wallace found that the marijuana was
uncovered in a routine search and that the questioning which took
place in the library was a spontaneous reaction to the discovery. 4 He
44. 384 U.S. at 474.
45. 589 F.2d at 429.
46. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). See note 38 supra.
47. 589 F.2d at 427.
48. Id. See note 30 supra.
49. Judge Wallace stated, "When prison questioning is at issue, however, this 'free to leave'
standard ceases to be a useful tool in determining the necessity of Miranda warnings. It would
lead to the conclusion that all prison questioning is custodial because a reasonable prisoner would
always believe he could not leave the prison freely." 589 F.2d at 428.
50. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
51. Id See note 40 supra.
52. 589 F.2d at 428.
53. Id at 429.
54. Id
6
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thus ruled that under the circumstances neither the prison setting nor
the presence of the deputy or the shift commander were factors which
would trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings.55 Rather, he held
that it was an instance of on-the-scene questioning.
5 6
Judge Anderson, in dissent, found the modified test to be unrealistic
and unworkable; but even under this test, the facts of the case demon-
strated that Cervantes was subjected to custodial interrogation.57
Judge Wallace summarily distinguished prior cases where custodial
interrogation was found in a prison setting without fully analyzing the
opinions, especially Mathis. In Mathis, the Supreme Court's decision
did not rest solely on the fact that the interrogator was not a prison
official, but included the factor that the questioning was for the purpose
of eliciting information which could be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion." The deputy's questioning of Cervantes was analogous to the
questioning in Mathis. Cervantes was confronted with a substance sus-
pected to be marijuana and asked to identify it, thus, an instance of
eliciting statements which could be used in a criminal prosecution.
This confrontation and questioning was what Judge Anderson referred
to in his dissent when he stated, "the questioning had reached the accu-
satory stage."59 Though Judge Wallace overlooked this fact, it was not
solely sufficient to require Miranda warnings, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Beckwith and Mathiason.
Judge Wallace, however, incorrectly applied the court's modified ob-
jective test to the facts of the case. Though the test was modified, the
factors which the court considered in applying the test remained the
same: the language used to summon him, the surroundings of the in-
terrogation, the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his
guilt, and the pressure exerted to detain him.61
Applying the factors to the instant case, Cervantes was subjected to
custodial interrogation. First, not only was Cervantes verbally sum-
moned to leave his cell, he was escorted by a prison official to the li-
brary.6 Second, Cervantes' surroundings were not that of his familiar
jail cell but the confines of a four foot by six foot library which con-
tained himself and two prison officials. 62 Third, Cervantes was literally
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id Judge Anderson stated that "the accusatory state was reached .... Even if this new
test should prove to be valid, the facts here bring Cervantes within the 'additional imposition on
his limited freedom of movement' and Miranda warnings were required."
58. 391 U.S. at 3.
59. 589 F.2d at 429. See note 49 supra.
60. Id at 428.
61. Id at 426.
62. Id at 426, 427.
7
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confronted with the evidence of his guilt and asked to identify it.63
Fourth, no apparent physical pressure was exerted to detain Cer-
vantes,' 4 but he realized that he could not leave without the officials'
permission. Thus, these factors, when considered with the additional
fact that Cervantes was a prisoner, a position of subservience to prison
officials, it was obvious that a reasonable person would believe that
there had been a restriction of his freedom over and above that of his
normal prisoner setting. Moreover, an examination of the above facts
in light of the purpose of Miranda, to "combat" a situation in which
there are "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely, '' 61 points out that Judge Wallace's
ruling flies in the face of Miranda, as well. Cervantes was interrogated
in "privacy" and in "unfamiliar surroundings," factors on which Mi-
randa placed great stress.66
Judge Wallace's attempt to obviate the fact that this was custodial
interrogation by labeling the entire occurrence as on-the-scene ques-
tioning lacked precedence. 67 Prior decisions finding on-the-scene ques-
tioning follow a distinct pattern. There was either an interrogation and
no coercive environment 68 or there was a coercive environment and no
interrogation, merely unsuspecting questioning. 69 There are no cases
that have found on-the-scene questioning where both of these elements
were present. As one legal scholar noted, "the interplay between inter-
rogation and custody makes the 'interrogation' more menacing than it
would be without the custody and the 'custody' more intimidating than
it would be without the interrogation. '"7° Judge Wallace ignored the
fact that Cervantes was no longer in his natural surroundings: his
prison cell, prison yard, or at work. At the point when Cervantes en-
63. Id at 427.
64. Id
65. 384 U.S. at 467.
66. Id at 449-50.
67. 589 F.2d at 429.
68. Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (officer stopped defendant's auto-
mobile and questioned him at the site; the Court found on-the-scene questioning). Lowe v.
United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969) (auto-stop situation; questioning took place at the
site; the Court found on-the-scene questioning). United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.
1970) (questioning of defendant on the street was found to be on-the-scene questioning); People v.
Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S. 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970)
(another case of on-the-scene questioning which occurred on the street). See Smith, supra note 28;
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
69. United States v. Wiggins, 509 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (defendant questioned at police
station. Defendant was at the station on a matter unrelated to officer's questioning. Court found
on-the-scene questioning because officer sought defendant only as a possible witness of informant,
not a suspect).
70. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda. Whai is "Interrogation"? 67 GEO.
L.J. 1, 63 (1978).
8
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tered the library with the shift commander, the first element, coercive
environment, was satisfied. When the deputy asked Cervantes,
"What's this?" the second element, interrogating question, had been
met. Therefore, a finding of on-the-scene questioning was incorrect.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit failed to follow prece-
dent for finding custodial interrogation in the prison setting. The
Cervantes decision so narrowed the scope of the Miranda rule as to
allow prison officials unlimited discretion in questioning prisoners. By
misapplying the modified test and ignoring the purpose of Miranda, the
court has gone so far as to give prison officials a privilege to ignore a
prisoner's fifth amendment right. This decision, however, was not sur-
prising; it was only another example of the Supreme Court's estab-
lished trend of gradually diminishing the effectiveness of Miranda.
CY A. GRANT
9
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